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The pre as well as post crisis discourse on global imbalances has largely focused on the zero-sum current 
account equation involving United States on the one side and the rest of the world (ROW) on the other. 
Most of the analysis has been from the perspective of the countries which are perceived to be integral 
part of the above equation. However, the implications of the imbalances went much beyond these few 
countries and had profound inﬂ  uence on the ﬁ  nancial stability and monetary management in many 
countries. The huge cross border capital ﬂ  ows during the pre crisis period, arising from the liquidity glut 
in advanced economies and abetted by the expansion of the ﬁ  nancial sector balance sheets, posed 
signiﬁ  cant challenges for domestic policy makers. It is this peripheral perspective that this paper attempts 
to bring forth.
India is indeed a peripheral country as far as global imbalances are concerned as it did not contribute 
to either the origination or propagation of the imbalances. Its growth process is not dependent in any 
signiﬁ  cant measure either on external demand or capital ﬂ  ows. It does not pursue a policy of achieving 
a particular level of current account deﬁ  cit or surplus to support its growth strategy. Its exchange rate is 
essentially market determined and it does not pursue an explicit policy of reserve accumulation.
However, India did face the impact of global imbalances as a receptacle of global funds ﬂ  ow which were 
essentially volatile in nature. The paper articulates the policy imperatives that arose in this context and the 
design of policy framework that helped in addressing the challenges. The response was, and continues 
to be driven by a non-doctrinaire, pragmatic approach with the sole objective of maintaining broader 
macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial stability.
The paper concludes with a discussion on the potential risks to global ﬁ  nancial stability on account of 
persisting global imbalances and the feasibility of post crisis efforts being pursued globally at various 
multinational fora to address these.
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P
ersistent and growing global imbalances 
were generally seen as a threat to global 
economic and ﬁ  nancial stability even before 
the subprime related pressures surfaced in 2007 and 
the debate on options to avoid a hard landing had 
already acquired centre stage in most international 
discussions. After the crisis, following sharp 
contraction in global trade and the loss of output and 
employment in advanced economies, the magnitude 
of the imbalances has moderated. The underlying 
factors that contributed to and sustained the 
imbalances, however, persist and going forward, the 
policy challenges from persistent imbalances are 
expected to accentuate. The post-crisis asymmetry 
in the pace of growth and stance of monetary policy 
between the advanced economies and the emerging 
market economies (EMEs), which may extend 
beyond 2011, will signiﬁ  cantly inﬂ  uence global trade 
and capital ﬂ  ows. These have triggered concerns 
relating to protectionism, currency interventions 
and use of capital controls as potential risks to the 
global economy. 
The pre as well as post-crisis discourse on global 
imbalances has largely focused on the zero-sum 
current account equation involving United States 
on the one side and the rest of the world (ROW) on 
the other. Most of the analysis has been from the 
perspective of the “core” group of countries which are 
perceived to be an integral part of the above equation. 
However, the implications of the imbalances were felt 
beyond these few countries, often having profound 
inﬂ  uence on the ﬁ  nancial stability and monetary 
management of many countries, including India. 
Since most of the arguments and counterarguments 
on different dimensions of the problem of global 
imbalances are public knowledge, this paper will 
focus on two broad aspects. The ﬁ  rst is the risks to 
ﬁ  nancial stability in every country from persistent 
global imbalances. Since no single country can 
resolve global imbalances by solo action, globally 
coordinated systems would have to bear the 
responsibility for both containing the imbalances 
in a non-disruptive manner and also for providing 
safety nets to individual countries facing the adverse 
impact of the imbalances on their ﬁ  nancial systems. 
The second aspect is the challenges that India would 
have to face while dealing with the ramiﬁ  cations of 
persistent imbalances even though India is peripheral 
to both the problem and its solution. 
India’s experience shows that a country can achieve 
and sustain high growth without adopting policies 
that contribute to global imbalances. A part of the 
global imbalances, driven by comparative cost 
advantages is, of course, a natural outcome of 
globalisation. But a large part of the imbalances is 
actually the result of national policies, which may be 
optimal for the country concerned, but sub-optimal 
for the global economy. I will conclude, therefore, by 
emphasising that a multilateral coordinated approach 
is the only option to deal with this global problem, 
and if the imbalances are allowed to continue as in 
the past, a main source of ﬁ  nancial instability will 
remain unaddressed.
1| WHY GLOBAL IMBALANCES MUST 
BE SEEN AS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTOR 
TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS?
Even though several alternative causative factors 
have been highlighted in the academic and policy 
debates while trying to unravel the genesis of the 
global crisis, I would specifically highlight the 
role of global imbalances, since crisis prevention 
mechanisms are generally being strengthened based 
on lessons from the crisis, but very little progress has 
been made in terms of effective policy coordination 
at the international level to contain the imbalances 
in future.
What is Global Imbalance? It is the large dispersion in 
the pattern of current account positions of countries, 
with some having large persistent deﬁ  cits and others 
running persistent surpluses (Chart 1). This aggregate 
overview masks the true nature of the imbalance. 
In the years preceding the crisis, deficit and 
surplus countries had built up mutual and growing 
interdependence. In the deﬁ  cit countries, particularly 
the United States, as domestic savings declined, they 
depended increasingly on capital ﬂ  ows for ﬁ  nancing 
investment and consumption. The mono-reserve 
currency status of the dollar and its safe-haven appeal 
provided the United States with unhindered access to 
capital from the ROW. On the other hand, countries 
with current account surpluses also had domestic 
savings, and had to look for external avenues for 
investment of the surplus. They became dependent 
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on deﬁ  cit countries such as the United States both 
for generating the surpluses in the ﬁ  rst place and 
for their investment. This mutual dependence bind 
served the interest of the national economies, at any 
rate in the short-term, but engendered imbalances 
at the global level which started threatening global 
monetary and ﬁ  nancial stability. 
2| HOW WERE THE IMBALANCES 
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS?
Four speciﬁ  c factors explain this point. The ﬁ  rst factor 
is the emergence of a global “saving glut”, which 
exerted sustained downward pressures on global 
interest rates. Even when the United States raised 
its short-term rates, long-term rates did not change, 
giving rise to the famous “Greenspan Conundrum”. 
With real interest rates remaining permanently 
depressed, there was a general “search for yield” in 
alternative ﬁ  nancial instruments, which provided the 
impetus to the growth of innovative ﬁ  nancial products 
in the United States, which later proved destructive. 
Second, several EMEs and oil exporting countries 
accumulated large foreign exchange reserves, which 
was largely a consequence of the growing imbalances, 
but also emanated partly from the preference of 
countries for stronger self-insurance following the 
experience of the Asian crisis of the mid-90s. Given 
the conservative investment norms for official 
reserves, reserves increasingly crowded-out private 
demand for high quality low-risk ﬁ  nancial assets, 
besides also abetting the under-pricing of risk in the 
United States because of the market presumption 
that its large current account deﬁ  cit (CAD) will be 
ﬁ  nanced on a sustainable basis by rising foreign 
reserves of the rest of the world. As a result, risk 
appetite for ﬁ  nancial products, whose risks were 
hard to understand, increased. 
Third, persistent global imbalances, aided by the 
saving glut and the mono-reserve currency status of 
the dollar, fuelled the asset price bubble. The bubble, 
as it was building up, distorted incentives as reﬂ  ected 
in the declining household saving and rising 
consumption in the United States, encouraged by 
the “wealth effect” of the asset prices and declining 
cost of debt. It would have been hardly feasible to 
sustain the levels of consumption and neglect savings 
without the global imbalances. 
The fourth and ﬁ  nal factor on the causation chain 
from global imbalances to the crisis is the absence of 
an effective alternative to the US dollar as the reserve 
currency; the United States running a current account 
deﬁ  cit on a sustained basis became a necessary 
condition for the world to meet its demand for 
international liquidity. The conﬁ  dence in the dollar 
led to deferment of the necessary macroeconomic 
adjustments in the United States and possibly also led 
to dilution of regulation and supervision standards 
that allowed its ﬁ  nancial system to grow freely by 
masking vulnerabilities. 
One of the effects of the persistent imbalances in 
the pre-crisis period was a signiﬁ  cant expansion 
in the ﬁ  nancial sector balance sheets in developed 
economies. The increasing financialisation of 
economies resulted in a self-fulfilling boom in 
ﬁ  nancial products and instruments, some of which 
were clearly far riskier than they were perceived 
to be. From the ﬁ  nancial stability perspective, it was 
this dominance of the ﬁ  nancial sector which was 
critical in shaping the regulatory philosophy in the 
pre-crisis period and in the rapid transmission of the 
crisis across the global ﬁ  nancial system. 
Chart 1
Global imbalances












Other current account deficit countries (OCADC)
China + EMA
Rest of the world
Discrepancy
OCADC: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Turkey and United Kingdom.
EMA: Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan Province of China and Thailand.
Source: IMF.
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3| SHOULD IMBALANCES BE SEEN 
AS A RISK TO FINANCIAL STABILITY 
IN THE FUTURE? 
In the absence of effective multilateral efforts to 
redress the imbalances, the risks to global monetary 
and ﬁ  nancial stability will persist. Current assessment 
suggests that the recent moderation in the magnitude 
of the imbalance is at best temporary, since the 
underlying drivers of imbalances will regain steam 
over time. Two new dimensions would impact 
the imbalances in the near-term. First, the OECD 
projects that output gaps in advanced economies 
will remain negative up to 2015. Given the robust 
recovery and strong growth outlook of EMEs, the 
monetary policy asymmetry between advanced 
economies and EMEs will likely not only continue 
but may even widen. While the growth imbalance 
will alter the current account positions of countries, 
the differentials in interest rates and earnings 
prospects may trigger surges in capital ﬂ  ows to EMEs, 
exerting upward pressure on their exchange rates 
and asset prices. Second, as projected by the IMF in 
its October 2010 WEO, due to lack of corresponding 
increase in absorptive capacity in EMEs, most of 
these inﬂ  ows may end up adding to their foreign 
exchange reserves and then ﬂ  ow back to the safe 
haven dollar. We will then return to the pre-crisis 
pattern of capital ﬂ  owing uphill. Save for the unlikely 
event of a sudden loss of faith in the US dollar, a hard 
landing or disruptive unwinding of the imbalances 
may not happen. But exchange rate and asset price 
uncertainties will persist.
The dynamics of public debt in major economies 
may, however, interfere with the process of 
redressing the imbalances. Pre-crisis, huge capital 
ﬂ  ows into developed economies and a general 
tendency for under-pricing of risks all around 
resulted in a benign perception of high public 
debt levels. Post crisis, however, ﬁ  scal health of 
sovereigns has become one of the key risks in global 
portfolio allocations. How the unwinding of large 
ﬁ  scal support is going to play out will be a critical 
determinant of the unwinding of imbalances. 
This risk is bound to impact the exchange rate 
readjustments as well. 
4| GLOBAL IMBALANCES AND INDIA
India is a peripheral country as far as global 
imbalances are concerned as it did not contribute 
to either the generation of the imbalances or their 
propagation. Its growth process is not dependent in 
any signiﬁ  cant measure either on external demand or 
capital ﬂ  ows; it does not pursue a policy of achieving 
a particular level of current account deﬁ  cit or surplus 
to support its growth strategy; its exchange rate is 
essentially market determined and it does not pursue 
an explicit policy of reserve accumulation. This paper 
explains these points in greater detail to emphasize 
the point that India did not contribute to global 
imbalances, but it cannot escape its ramiﬁ  cations, 
and hence has a stake in the resolution of global 
imbalances on a sustainable basis. 
•  India’s high domestic saving rate has coexisted with 
sustainable current account deﬁ  cit, a key trend that 
differentiates India from other major countries that 
contributed to the global imbalances. In India, even 
though the saving rate has improved signiﬁ  cantly 
in the last decade, the investment rate continued 
to exceed the saving rate, implying full absorption 
of domestic saving at home (Chart 2).1 Excluding a 
short period of current account surpluses, India has 
generally witnessed current account deﬁ  cits within a 
range of 3 per cent of GDP (Chart 3). Thus, domestic 








































Source: Reserve Bank of India.
1  As the ﬁ  nancial year in India begins in April each yearly data (in Charts 2, 3 and 6) is overlapping two calendar years and Q1 (in Chart 7) represents April 
to June period
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foreign capital to the extent of the ﬁ  nancing needs 
of CAD. All in all, the investment and growth process 
of India has not been excessively dependent on either 
external demand or external capital.
• India has had a market driven ﬂ  exible exchange 
rate regime since 1993. The exchange rate policy 
has not been guided by any speciﬁ  c goal relating to 
exports or the current account position in the balance 
of payments (Chart 4). The thrust of the exchange 
rate policy has been to contain undue volatility, 
particularly that arising from volatile capital ﬂ  ows, 
but such intervention is not conditioned by any 
targeted exchange rate. The two way movement of 
the exchange rate, and the absence of a policy on 
using exchange rate as an instrument to attain any 
goals relating to external balance position or domestic 
inﬂ  ation vindicates India’s position that its policies 
do not contribute to global imbalances. The absence 
of a sustained major undervaluation of the rupee is 
also evident from the behaviour of the real effective 
exchange rate (REER), which has exhibited a mean 
reverting pattern and generally remained around the 
base level in the medium-run (Chart 5). 
•  India has often experienced surges in capital ﬂ  ows 
(particularly during 2003-2008), a part of which 
ﬁ  nanced the current account, and the balance led 
to build up of reserves. The pattern of capital ﬂ  ows to 
India, thus, is consistent with the expected downhill 
ﬂ  ow pattern from advanced economies to emerging 
and developing economies, unlike the uphill pattern 
that was evident for some of the other countries 
that contributed to the global imbalances. As could 
be seen from Chart 6, annual net capital ﬂ  ows to 
Chart 3
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Chart 5
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Chart 4
Rupee/US dollar exchange rate




























Source: Reserve Bank of India.
Chart 6
Net capital ﬂ  ows and net porfolio ﬂ  ows
(% to GDP)





























Source: Reserve Bank of India.
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India have often exceeded the ﬁ  nancing needs in 
the current account, and net inﬂ  ows were as high as 
10 per cent of GDP in 2007-2008, when the current 
account deﬁ  cit was only 1.3 per cent of GDP. As a 
result, the remaining part of the inﬂ  ows returned 
to the ROW through deployment of India’s foreign 
exchange reserves in the international markets. 
• India does not have a self-insurance policy, 
even though forex market interventions of the 
Reserve Bank and significant increase in forex 
reserves built up over the last one decade have often 
been highlighted by analysts as obvious examples of 
a strategy on self insurance. One needs to understand 
why these two indicators are not the only possible 
characterisation of a self-insurance policy. 
The variations in India’s foreign exchange reserves 
are an offshoot of its exchange rate policy, which is to 
intervene in the market only to smooth exchange rate 
volatility and prevent disruptions to macroeconomic 
stability. The “volatility centric approach” to exchange 
rate also stems from the source of volatility, which is 
capital ﬂ  ows. As could be seen from Chart 7, India’s 
foreign exchange reserves had increased alongside 
increase in the stock of overall external liabilities 
as well as portfolio liabilities, and the latter have 
occasionally been highly volatile. To manage the 
episodic pattern of surges, reversals and sudden 
stops in such ﬂ  ows, given their sudden and damaging 
implications for the exchange rate and domestic 
liquidity conditions, intervention purchases/sales 
have been resorted to, which gets reﬂ  ected in the 
country’s foreign exchange reserves. 
Past experience suggests that even while India’s 
reserves got built up over the years owing to capital 
ﬂ  ows in excess of the ﬁ  nancing needs in the current 
account, the same reserves at times had to be used 
to contain volatility in the event of capital reversals. 
Importantly, given India’s persistent trade and 
current account deﬁ  cits, its foreign exchange reserves 
comprise borrowed funds, which is qualitatively 
different from accumulating reserves through trade 
and current account surpluses. Foreign reserves have 
certainly helped India to face the adverse external 
sector shocks better, but they do not reﬂ  ect the result 
of any speciﬁ  c policy adopted by India that could 
have contributed to global imbalances. 
5| HOW HAS INDIA MANAGED 
THE FALLOUT OF GLOBAL IMBALANCES?
For India, given its gradual opening to globalisation 
involving both trade and ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows, managing 
the implications of global imbalances has been a 
constant policy challenge. The dimension of the 
challenge magnified significantly when these 
imbalances emerged as a major contributing factor 
to the global crisis. In the period leading to the crisis, 
India had to actively manage surges in capital ﬂ  ows 
triggered by excess global liquidity. 
It is now well recognised that large capital ﬂ  ows 
in short bursts, beyond the absorptive capacity of 
an economy, impose signiﬁ  cant costs. From the 
macroeconomic perspective, exchange rate 
overshooting becomes a real possibility, causing 
lasting damage to the real sector competitiveness and 
hence the current account balance. Such inﬂ  ows can 
also militate against the monetary policy objectives 
during a domestic tightening phase and can impact 
the autonomy of monetary authorities to set domestic 
interest rates. There are also implications for ﬁ  nancial 
stability in the form of induced risks of asset price 
bubbles, excessive foreign currency exposures and 
crowding out of domestic ﬁ  nancial institutions on the 
lending side thereby increasing their risk appetite 
in search of returns, resulting in misallocation of 
capital. All these impose signiﬁ  cant adjustment 
costs and complicate monetary and exchange rate 
management. 
Chart 7
Reserve assets relative to total external liabilities 
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Source: Reserve Bank of India.
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The policy approach in India to the issue of capital 
ﬂ  ows has evolved from addressing the singular 
variable of exchange rate to the broader objective of 
maintaining ﬁ  nancial and macroeconomic stability. 
The salient elements of this framework are as under:
• an explicitly stated active capital account 
management framework, based on the policy stance 
of encouraging non-debt creating and long-term 
capital inﬂ  ows and discouraging debt ﬂ  ows; 
• avoiding the ‘original sin’ of excessive foreign 
currency borrowings by domestic entities, particularly 
the sovereign;
• prudential regulations to prevent excessive 
dollarisation of balance sheets of ﬁ  nancial sector 
intermediaries, particularly banks; and
• signiﬁ  cant liberalisation of permissible avenues for 
outward investments for domestic entities.
The above framework has till now obviated the need 
for sudden capital control measures, which could be 
perceived to have a longer term adverse impact. In any 
case, the objective of any capital control measures 
cannot be to protect a particular level of exchange rate 
or to control the aggregate ﬂ  ows but only to reduce 
the volatility impact of excessive short term ﬂ  ows.
6| MULTILATERAL POLICY RESPONSE 
TO GLOBAL IMBALANCES
The IMF’s multilateral consultation process on global 
imbalances, which was endorsed by the International 
Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) in 2006, 
suggests that global imbalances were clearly seen as 
a source of vulnerability even before the global crisis. 
Also what individual countries should do to contain 
the risks was more or less known. The actions that 
are being contemplated now by the G20 are not very 
different. Rebalancing will require deﬁ  cit economies 
to save more and consume less while maintaining 
open markets and enhancing export competitiveness. 
They need to depend more on external demand for 
growth and their currencies have to undergo a real 
depreciation. The surplus economies will need to 
adopt the opposite stance, i.e., save less and spend 
more, and shift from external to domestic demand. 
They may also need to let their currencies appreciate. 
Thus, movement in currency is generally believed 
to be part of the solution. 
Managing currency tensions will require a shared 
understanding on keeping exchange rates aligned 
to economic fundamentals and an agreement that 
currency interventions should be resorted to not as 
an instrument of trade policy but only to manage 
disruptions to macroeconomic stability. In their 
Toronto Summit in July 2010, the G20 leaders 
agreed on a “Framework for strong, sustainable and 
balanced growth”. At the heart of this Framework 
are strategies to be put in place by advanced and 
emerging economies to restore external balances 
and repair their ﬁ  nancial sectors where need be. 
For reasons that are quite obvious, these national 
strategies have to be coordinated in content and 
in implementation. Any framework like this can 
be successful only in an atmosphere of trust and 
reciprocity. From the perspective of EMEs, the 
critical issue would be to have recourse to viable 
policy options to address the potentially disruptive 
impact of spurts in capital inﬂ  ows as well as outﬂ  ows. 
This would be particularly relevant for countries 
having a relatively more open capital account. In 
this regard, ex ante measures of managing capital 
ﬂ  ows would be as important as the ex post measures 
of dealing with the implications. 
Increasingly, ex ante management of capital ﬂ  ows 
using price-based measures has come to be recognised 
as a legitimate tool of macroeconomic management 
with even agencies such as the IMF taking a more 
ﬂ  exible view in this regard. The objective of such 
measures is to alter the structure of price incentives 
that market participants confront thereby inducing 
them to modify their behaviour. However, evidence 
from different countries on the effectiveness of the 
above measures is inconclusive. The limited studies 
that are available suggest that capital controls have 
a stronger effect on the composition of inﬂ  ows than 
on their aggregate volume and do not materially 
impact the level of the real exchange rate. The main 
criticism against the above measures has been that, 
in practice, it may be difﬁ  cult to implement them 
effectively. However, the bottom line is that there 
is a cost involved in any form of evasion which is 
precisely the limited objective of the measures –to 
throw sand in the wheels of capital ﬂ  ows. 
Exchange rate appreciation is generally touted as 
the preferred ex post policy option in dealing with 
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inﬂ  ows. The only caveat accepted post-crisis is that 
intervention may be justiﬁ  ed only if there is major 
veering away of the currency from its fundamental 
value. The aftermath of the crisis has triggered 
a debate on the costs of building up reserves 
as a self-insurance, and the risks of continuing 
with a mono-reserve currency –the US dollar. 
While multilateral/regional/bilateral arrangements 
to enhance alternatives to foreign exchange 
reserves will be supported by most countries, the 
self insurance motive and national policies on forex 
reserves may need to continue. In evaluating the 
level of reserves and the quantum of self insurance 
of a country, however, it is important to distinguish 
between countries whose reserves are a consequence 
of current account surpluses and countries with 
current account deﬁ  cit like India whose reserves are 
a result of capital inﬂ  ows in excess of their economy’s 
absorptive capacity. On the reserve currency debate, 
we need to explore all options for protecting ourselves 
from the vulnerabilities that we confront as a 
consequence of a single reserve currency. 
The crisis has taught us that no country can be an island and that economic and ﬁ  nancial disruptions 
anywhere can cause ripples, if not waves, everywhere. The crisis also taught us that given the deepening 
integration of countries into the global economic and ﬁ  nancial system, uncoordinated responses 
will lead to worse outcomes for everyone. The global problems we are facing today are complex and not 
amenable to easy solutions. Many of them require signiﬁ  cant and often painful adjustments at the national 
level, and in a world divided by nation-states, there is no natural constituency for the global economy. 
At the same time, the global crisis has shown that the global economy as an entity is more important 
than ever. 
Since global imbalances clearly contributed to the ﬁ  nancial crisis, they will remain a potential risk to global 
monetary and ﬁ  nancial stability in the future, unless globally coordinated country-speciﬁ  c national policy 
measures are implemented to limit at least the policy induced part of the imbalances. At the same time, 
the global governance systems need to be able to provide the requisite comfort to member jurisdictions 
that their interests will not get compromised in times of crisis, something which was found lacking during 
the crisis. 
Going forward, a critical counterfactual that needs to be answered is whether more effective regulation 
and supervision of the ﬁ  nancial sector, both at the global as well as national levels, could have mitigated 
some of the adverse fallout of the global imbalances. After all, the ﬁ  nancial sector emerged as the ultimate 
receptacle for the negative externalities arising out of the imbalances. Therefore at least part of the adverse 
fallout of imbalances could have been addressed through the propagation channel i.e. the ﬁ  nancial sector. 
It is in this context that macroprudential national policy frameworks are signiﬁ  cant.
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